Timeline for Five pirates splitting gold with a twist
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
29 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Jul 28 at 10:35 | comment | added | lost | Also, while pirates trying to avoid death is logical assumption, "pirates trying to avoid ANY chance of death even if they stand to earn much by risking death" is not logical ... after all, they are "pirates" - it is in their job description to risk their lives in order to earn gold ;p | |
| Jul 28 at 10:27 | comment | added | lost | It seems we have several problems here, based on "semi or fully" secret vote and "life or gold" priority. OP asked for "Fully+Gold" ( which was what I assumed and answered), and your solutions are for "Semi+Life" and "Fully+Life". I guess we only miss "Semi+Gold" now ;p | |
| Jul 28 at 10:21 | comment | added | lost | yes, I saw that comment from OP, and I assumed your initial solution is correct under those "death above all" assumptions. But my comment was regarding your 2nd solution in "Starting Over... With a Parrot" , where you presumably answered OP. | |
| Jul 28 at 9:59 | comment | added | JS1 | @lost This puzzle was from 9 years ago so I didn't remember it well. The first comment above from the OP already states that he didn't intend for survivability to be a factor, which means that my answer was already known to be incorrect according to the OP. I answered under the assumption that pirates prioritized self survival (as is the rule from the linked puzzle). I did not change my answer after the OP's comment because I believe that in a pirate gold splitting puzzle where a pirate dies if their proposal is defeated, it only stands to reason that pirates try to avoid death. | |
| Jul 27 at 20:23 | comment | added | lost | with an accent on "expected earnings" and " likelihood of survival is not a factor" | |
| Jul 27 at 20:22 | comment | added | lost | But that is already explicitly stated in question: "The other pirates are perfect logicians who always act to maximize their own expected earnings. If multiple strategies yield the same expected value, then they randomly select among them. For this puzzle, maximizing likelihood of survival or bloodthirstiness are not factors." | |
| Jul 27 at 19:20 | comment | added | lost | so if you wanted to protect vs fevered one, P5 should offer 93/93/0/33/81 BUT P5 offering what I suggested ( 0/0/93/33/174 ) is still better, since it has 50% chance to pass , with expected gain of 174/2=87, which is more than 'certain' 81 gain from 93/93/0/33/81 | |
| Jul 27 at 19:16 | comment | added | lost | Problem clearly states "The other pirates are perfect logicians who always act to maximize their own expected earnings". So if P4 has expected earning of 32.7 if he gets to propose, he will vote NO on zero offer ( since voting YES would gain him ..well, 0 ). | |
| Jul 27 at 11:22 | comment | added | lost | also, if expectations after 4th pirate proposal was 92.74/92.74/92.74/32.7 (which is not correct, see previous comment, but lets assume it is), best offer for 5th pirate is not 93/93/0/0/114 ... he should have offered 0/0/93/33/174 ( ie offer to 4th pirate since he has lowest expectation). | |
| Jul 27 at 10:56 | comment | added | lost | This is bit late comment, but answer for original (parrot) problem is incorrect. It assume that P4 can offer 101/101/0/98 even if he has fever, and OP clearly states that pirate with zanzibar fever must offer equally, so P4 would have to offer 75/75/75/75 in that case | |
| May 5, 2015 at 19:26 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
Corrected a typo, the result of too much editing.
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| May 5, 2015 at 19:09 | comment | added | Engineer Toast | I wish I could give +2 | |
| May 4, 2015 at 15:24 | vote | accept | Tyler Seacrest | ||
| May 2, 2015 at 15:29 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| May 2, 2015 at 14:42 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| May 2, 2015 at 9:18 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| May 2, 2015 at 9:07 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| May 2, 2015 at 8:55 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| May 2, 2015 at 8:23 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
New answer given secret ballot clarification
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| May 2, 2015 at 7:52 | comment | added | Tyler Seacrest | The ship's parrot counts the votes, and of course everyone trusts the parrot. | |
| May 2, 2015 at 7:51 | comment | added | JS1 | @TylerSeacrest If the vote count isn't revealed, then how can the pirates trust the vote? Who is counting the ballots and what if they lie? I guess I watch too much Survivor lol. | |
| May 2, 2015 at 7:44 | comment | added | Tyler Seacrest | Wow, fantastic answer! I especially like the part where P1 and P2 use a mixed strategy for voting. Unfortunately, I was intending survival not to be a factor, and I also interpreted the secret vote as not revealing even the vote count. I'll upvote but not accept yet in case someone wants to attack my interpretation. Sorry for the ambiguity. | |
| May 2, 2015 at 7:23 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| May 2, 2015 at 7:06 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| May 2, 2015 at 7:00 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| May 2, 2015 at 6:53 | history | undeleted | JS1 | ||
| May 2, 2015 at 6:53 | history | edited | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| May 2, 2015 at 6:36 | history | deleted | JS1 | via Vote | |
| May 2, 2015 at 6:36 | history | answered | JS1 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |